Addressing Social
Security’s potential long-term financing challenges by taking
the dramatic step of diverting its payroll taxes to create new
personal accounts will have drastic consequences for federal
finances, future retirees, and those who rely on the system
the most. Learn more about twelve major reasons why less
costly and less painful reforms should be considered
instead.
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format here.
Introduction
President George W.
Bush repeatedly has emphasized that one of his foremost
second-term priorities will be to transform Social Security
fundamentally. Enacted in 1935 and amended many times
since-including major changes in 1983-Social Security provides
benefits to workers and their family members upon retirement,
disability, or death. Since the program's inception, the size
of those benefits always has depended on the earnings of
workers over the course of their careers. President Bush wants
to change the system so that the amount that each worker
collects from Social Security upon retirement instead would
hinge on the size of investments in his or her own personal
account.
Although the President has not yet endorsed a
specific plan, the President's Commission to Strengthen Social
Security put forward three proposals in 2002 that likely will
form the basis for his plan to create private accounts. An
analysis of those proposals showed that paying for new
personal accounts while continuing to provide benefits to
Social Security's current beneficiaries would require some
combination of federal borrowing, tax increases, and benefit
cuts amounting
to between $2 trillion and $3 trillion over the coming
decades.
President Bush and others who support private
accounts argue that such dramatic changes are necessary
because Social Security faces a financing shortfall, according
to projections of the system's trustees. The trustees' latest
estimates, based on economic and population assumptions they
call neither optimistic nor pessimistic, show that Social
Security will continue to be able to pay benefits in full
until its trust funds are exhausted in the year 2042. After
that, funding would be sufficient to provide about 70 percent
of currently promised benefits. (The Congressional Budget
Office, perhaps more realistically, recently projected that
the reserves would last until 2052 and would be able to pay
about 80 percent of current benefits thereafter.) Private
account advocates also emphasize that while today's retirees
generally receive far more from Social Security than they
contributed in taxes, the so-called "rate of return" for
tomorrow's retirees is projected to be substantially less
generous.
Much is at stake in this debate. More than
96 percent of workers pay Social Security taxes and thereby
are entitled to collect benefits from the program. More than
47 million Americans today receive checks from the Social
Security system. Although the average monthly payment to those
individuals is a modest $895, Social Security constitutes more
than half of the incomes of nearly two-thirds of retired
Americans. For one in five, it is their only income. Like past
generations of Americans, today's workers of all ages will
need Social Security to protect them against forces beyond
their control-economic ups and downs, inflation, fluctuating
investment markets, and possible disability or premature death
of a family member. That insurance has been essential in even
the best of times, and will be all the more important in an
increasingly global economy with large and growing federal
budget and trade deficits.
Addressing Social Security's
potential long-term financing challenges by taking the
dramatic step of diverting its payroll taxes to create new
personal accounts would represent a radical departure; it also
would be a bad idea. Here are twelve reasons why less costly,
less risky, and less painful changes should be considered
instead:
REASON #1: Today's insurance to protect
workers and their families against death and disability would
be threatened.
"Rate of return" calculations neglect the value of Social
Security's insurance protections. Of the 45 million Americans
who collect payments from the Social Security program, over
one-third (almost 17 million) are not retired workers. Among
those currently receiving Social Security payments are 5
million spouses and children of retired and disabled workers,
7 million spouses and dependent children of deceased workers,
and 5 million disabled workers. Proposals to privatize Social
Security involve shifting some of the money financing the
current insurance program into investment accounts assigned to
each worker. But the payroll taxes carved out to pay for
personal accounts are resources that are need to support
today's payments to recipients of Social Security's survivors
and disability insurance as well as retirement benefits.
Simple arithmetic suggests that every dollar shifted from
Social Security programs to personal accounts is a dollar less
to provide guaranteed income to the 37 percent of
beneficiaries who are not retired workers.
The three
alternatives put forward by the President's Commission to
Strengthen Social Security would, in the absence of individual
accounts, restore long-term Social Security solvency either
largely or entirely through benefit reductions that would
apply to all beneficiaries-including the disabled. In the
principal proposals put forward by the Commission, the
reduction in disability benefits was draconian, with cuts
ranging from 19 percent to 47.5 percent after the year 2030.
The commission itself somewhat disavowed this aspect of its
proposals, suggesting that a subsequent commission or other
body that specializes in disability policy might revise how
its plans apply to the disabled.
Economists Peter A.
Diamond (MIT) and Peter R. Orszag (Brookings) have noted that
the disabled would have limited ability to mitigate the
effects of these benefit reductions by securing income from
individual accounts. One reason is that their individual
accounts often would be meager, since those who become
disabled before retirement age may have relatively few years
of work during which they could make contributions to their
accounts. Second, under the commission proposals, disabled
beneficiaries (like all other beneficiaries) would not be
allowed access to their individual accounts until they reached
retirement age.
As the Bush commission itself
acknowledged, preserving existing disability and survivor's
insurance greatly escalates the cost of financing private
accounts. It is difficult to imagine how any Social Security
privatization plan can avoid significant cuts in those
essential protections.
REASON #2: Creating private accounts would
make Social Security's financing problem worse, not
better.
Social Security is funded by a flat tax of 12.4 percent of
each worker's wage income, up to $90,000 in 2005, split evenly
between employers and employees. About four out of five of
those tax dollars go immediately to current beneficiaries, and
the remaining dollar is used to purchase U.S. Treasury
securities held in the system's trust funds. Beginning in
2018, well after the huge generation of baby boomers born
between 1946 and 1964 begins to retire, a portion of general
income tax revenues will be needed to pay interest and
eventually principal on those bonds to fully finance benefits.
A "crisis" is not forecast to arise until the program becomes
entirely "pay as you go" again (as it was throughout its
history before 1983) in either 2042 according to the trustees'
forecast or 2052 according to the Congressional Budget Office.
(By way of perspective, in 2052 the oldest surviving baby
boomers will be 106 years old and the youngest will be
88.)
Diverting 2 percent of payroll to create private
accounts as proposed by the President's Commission to
Strengthen Social Security doesn't sound very radical, but it
would shorten significantly the time until current benefit
levels could only be sustained by raising taxes. In part, this
is because funds now being set aside to build up the trust
funds to provide for retiring baby boomers would be used
instead to pay for the privatization accounts. The government
would have to start borrowing from the private sector almost
immediately to be able to meet commitments to retirees and
near-retirees. As the figure below shows, the trust funds
would be exhausted before 2030 instead of the thirty-eight to
forty-eight years projected if nothing is done. In such a
short time frame, the investments in the personal accounts
will not be nearly large enough to provide an adequate
cushion. The upshot: a much larger share of today's workers
would confront large benefit cuts, or tax increases, than if
no changes were implemented.
Click
to view Figure 1: Effect of a 2 Percent Carve Out on Trust
Fund Assets to 2030
Source: Based on
analysis in Peter A. Diamond and Peter R. Orszag, "An
Assessment of the Proposals of the President's Commission to
Strengthen Social Security," The Brookings Institution,
Washington, D.C., June 2002.
REASON #3: Creating private accounts could
dampen economic growth, which would further weaken Social
Security's future finances.
Privatizing Social Security will escalate federal deficits
and debt significantly while increasing the likelihood that
national savings will decline-all of which could reduce
long-term economic growth and the size of the economic pie
available to pay for the retirement of the baby boom
generation. The 2004 Economic
Report of the President included an analysis of the fiscal
impact over time of the most commonly discussed privatization
proposal by the president's commission. It found that the
federal budget deficit would be more than 1 percent of gross
domestic product (GDP) higher every year for roughly two
decades, with the highest increase being 1.6 percent of GDP in
2022. The national debt levels would be increased by an amount
equal to 23.6 percent of GDP in 2036. That means that,
thirty-two years from now, the debt burden for every man,
woman, and child would be $132,000 higher because of
privatization.
One impact of those seemingly
abstract numbers after privatization is that interest rates
are likely to be substantially higher, raising the cost to the
average household of mortgages, car loans, student loans,
credit cards and so on. As a result, the economy would be
likely to grow more slowly than it would
otherwise.
Creating private accounts with increased
federal borrowing at first blush would seem unlikely to affect
national savings, because additional savings in the new
accounts would offset exactly any new government borrowing to
pay for those accounts. Economists believe that increased
national savings, especially in a country with savings levels
as low as they are in the United States, can increase growth
by keeping interest rates low and financing investments in
productive activities.
But privatization is actually
more likely to reduce than increase national savings. Diamond
and Orszag point out that evaluating the overall effect on
national savings requires taking into account the likely
responses of government, employers, and households.
Historically, neither the government nor businesses have
changed their spending levels consistently in response to
large changes in deficit levels. But households that consider
the new accounts to constitute meaningful increases in their
retirement wealth might well reduce their other saving.
Diamond and Orszag argue, "If anything, our impression is that
diverting a portion of the current Social Security surplus
into individual accounts could reduce national saving." That,
in turn, would further weaken economic growth and our capacity
to pay for the retirement of the baby boomers.
REASON #4: Privatization has been a
disappointment elsewhere.
Advocates of
privatization often cite other countries such as Chile and the
United Kingdom, where the governments pushed workers into
personal investment accounts to reduce the long-term
obligations of their Social Security systems, as models for
the United States to emulate. But the sobering experiences in
those countries actually provide strong arguments against
privatization.
A
report this year from the World Bank, once an enthusiastic
privatization proponent, expressed disappointment that in
Chile, and in most other Latin American countries that
followed in its footsteps, "more than half of all workers [are
excluded] from even a semblance of a safety net during their
old age."
Other cautionary points made in the World
Bank report and other studies about the experience in
Chile:
- Investment accounts of retirees are much smaller than
originally predicted-so low that 41 percent of those
eligible to collect pensions continue to work.
- Voracious commissions and other administrative costs
have swallowed up large shares of those accounts. The
brokerage firm CB
Capitales calculated (see english language discussion by
Stephen Kay here)
that when commission charges are taken into consideration in
Chile, the total average return on worker contributions
between 1982 and 1999 was 5.1 percent-not 11 percent as
calculated by the superintendent of pension funds. That
report found that the average worker would have done better
simply by placing their pension fund contributions in a
passbook savings account.
- The
transition costs of shifting to a privatized system in
Chile averaged 6.1 percent of GDP in the 1980s, 4.8 percent
in the 1990s, and are expected to average 4.3 percent from
1999 to 2037. Those costs are far higher than originally
projected, in part because the government is obligated to
provide subsidies for workers failing to accumulate enough
money in their accounts to earn a minimum pension.
In the United Kingdom, which began encouraging workers to
divert payroll taxes to personal investment accounts in 1978,
many citizens were victimized by poor investment choices as
well as unscrupulous brokers. The national government was left
with substantial new administrative expenses, lost tax
revenues, and responsibilities to bail out some failed private
pension plans. Indeed, the problems were so wide-ranging that
even the most enthusiastic supporters of private accounts now
say that the United Kingdom simply did not do it right.
A British government commission headed by Adair Turner
reported in October 2004 that Britain had been living in "a
fool's paradise" by thinking it had solved its pension
problems. According to pension experts at the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the Adair Turner
report has sounded alarm bells. "What looked like a very good
idea from a financial perspective in cutting costs has put
pensioner poverty, which had been all but eradicated, back on
the agenda."
REASON #5: The odds are
against individuals investing successfully.
Privatization advocates like to stress the appeal of
"individual choice" and "personal control," while assuming in
their forecasts that everyone's accounts will match the
overall performance of the stock market. But studies by Yale
economist Robert J. Shiller and others have demonstrated that
individual investors are far more likely to do worse than the
market generally, even excluding the cost of commissions and
administrative expenses. Indeed, research by Princeton
University economist Burton Malkiel found that even
professional money managers over time significantly
underperformed indexes of the entire market.
Moreover,
a number of surveys show that most people lack the knowledge
to make even basic decisions about investing. For example, a
Securities and Exchange Commission report synthesizing surveys
of investors found that only 14 percent knew the difference
between a growth stock and an income stock, and just 38
percent understood that when interest rates rise, bond prices
go down. Almost half of all investors believed incorrectly
that diversification guarantees that their portfolio won't
suffer if the market drops and 40 percent thought that a
mutual fund's operating costs have no impact on the returns
they receive.
While predictions vary significantly
about how investment markets will perform in the decades
ahead, it's safe to say that any growth in individual accounts
under privatization will be significantly lower than what the
overall markets achieve.
REASON #6:
What you get will depend on whether you retire when the market
is up or down.
In the twentieth century, when stocks generally grew
significantly, there were three twenty-year periods over which
the market either declined or did not rise. The volatility of
investment markets means that it matters a great deal whether
you retire during an upswing or downturn. For example, a
worker who invested his or her retirement fund in a stock
portfolio that matched the Standard & Poor's 500 index and
cashed out upon retirement in March 2000 would have a nest egg
almost a third larger than someone who retired just a year
later using exactly the same investment strategy. Of course,
that is because the stock market plunged over those twelve
months.
Gary
Burtless of the Brookings Institution demonstrated how
much timing matters under privatization by examining what
would have happened to workers with forty-year careers who
retired in each year from 1911 until 2002. Following
Burtless's method, the figure below assumes that each worker
put 7 percent of his or her earnings in the stock market every
year (reinvesting dividends) and earned the actual historical
return, year by year. It shows the wide variation in the
retirement income workers would have received. Clearly, some
workers would do much better than others based simply on when
they happened to retire-that would be a major change from
today's system.
Click
to view Figure 2: Value of Annuity Purchased At Retirement
With Individual Account Invested In Stocks
Note: Assumed contribution rate is 7 percent of
wages. Author's tabulations of U.S. equity and bond return
data supplied by Global Financial Data (March
2003).
Source: Gary Burtless, Personal
communication.
REASON #7: Wall Street would reap
windfalls from your taxes.
Brokerage houses, banks, and mutual funds have been very
active in the campaign to privatize Social Security. Small
wonder, since they stand to gain enormous fees if billions of
dollars are shifted each year from Social Security payments
into accounts under Wall Street management. Of course, those
fees must come from somewhere, namely from the balances in
individual accounts.
Among the one hundred best stock
mutual funds, management fees range from 0.2 percent per year
to 1.4 percent of the asset value of an account. The average
is near the high end of that range, however, and many mutual
funds charge substantially more. Smaller accounts require
proportionately larger management fees because many costs such
as gathering and mailing out information do not depend on
account size. Indeed, most mutual funds actively discourage
small accounts by setting a minimum opening deposit of $1,000
to $3,000.
Experience in the United Kingdom offers a
warning about what the future could bring regarding management
costs. Workers there have been allowed to open private
accounts starting in 1988, since which time management fees
and marketing costs among financial intermediaries have eaten
up an average of 43 percent of the return on investment.
REASON #8: Private accounts would require
a new government bureaucracy.
From the standpoint of the system as a whole, privatization
would add enormous administrative burdens. Instead of the
current trust fund accounts, the government would need to
establish and track many small accounts, perhaps as many
accounts as there are taxpaying workers-147 million in 1997.
Many workers' accounts would be so small that they
would be of no interest to profit-making firms. The average
taxable earnings of a worker are roughly $25,000 (in 1997, the
last year with complete data, the average taxable earnings of
the workers who paid into the system were $22,400). Two
percent of $25,000 comes to $500 per year. Francis X.
Cavanaugh, who has supervised the thrift savings program for
federal employees, a program that privatization advocates
often point to as a model, has
argued that the costs of administering so many small
accounts would overwhelm any benefits to be gained from the
stock market. For example, he estimates that the government
would need to hire 10,000 highly trained workers just to
oversee the accounts and answer questions from workers. In
contrast, today's Social Security has minimal administrative
costs amounting to less than 1 percent of annual
revenues.
REASON #9: Young people
would be worse off.
Social Security privatization is often sold to young adults
as a much better deal for them than the current system. But
two recent studies show that if Social Security is converted
to a system of private accounts, younger generations will be
the ones who bear the costs of transforming the program. The
added costs arise from the huge increases in federal borrowing
needed to finance the new accounts while continuing to direct
payroll taxes toward existing benefits for current retirees.
According to the Congressional
Budget Office, "to raise the rate of return for future
generations by moving to a funded system, some generations
must receive rates of return even lower than they would have
gotten under the pay-as-you-go system."
A July 2004 Congressional
Budget Office analysis of a private account proposal by
the President's Commission to Strengthen Social Security
compares it with the existing system. It looked at two
scenarios for the traditional Social Security system, one with
payments continuing in full indefinitely and the other with
the trust funds becoming depleted in a few decades and
payments shrinking to three-fourths their current level. In
both scenarios, nearly all birth cohorts at all income levels
born from the 1940s through the first decade of the 21st
century on average do worse under the proposed system of
private accounts. Only individuals in the lowest earning
quintiles from the 1950s and the 1990s do slightly better, on
average. Even assuming a worst case scenario where the trust
funds evaporate and benefits are cut substantially, cohorts
from the 1960s to 2000s would see reductions with private
accounts between 1 percent and 17.5 percent on average,
depending on their income and birth year.
An
earlier analysis by economists Henry Aaron, Alan Blinder,
Alicia Munnell, and Peter Orszag used the broad outlines of
then-Governor Bush's Social Security privatization proposals
to compare retirement benefits under current law to those if
private accounts were introduced. They found that benefits for
an average earning worker who retired in 2037 at age 67
(someone aged 34 today) would be 20 percent lower than they
are now given historical rates of return over a fifty-year
period.
REASON # 10: Women stand to
lose the most.
The Social Security system is gender-blind. None of its
provisions treat women differently from men. But that does not
mean that the results are gender-neutral. Various cultural and
biological differences add up to the fact that Social
Security is much more essential, and a much better deal, for
women than for men. Of all groups, none has more to lose
from the privatization of Social Security than women. Compared
to the average man, the average woman
- works fewer years outside the home,
- earns less per year, and
- lives longer after retiring.
Together, these differences mean that women depend more
than men do on spousal and survivors' benefits, they collect
benefits for more years than men do, and a greater proportion
of their total retirement income comes from Social Security.
Since women on average work fewer years at lower pay,
they contribute less in payroll taxes over their lifetimes
than do men. But in their various roles as retirees, spouses,
and widows, women collect Social Security benefits for more
years than men. The result is that women get more net benefits
over their lifetimes than do men.
There are fourteen
women for every ten men aged 62 or older. Above age 85, this
ratio reaches twenty-four women per ten men. Consequently, 60
percent of all Social Security beneficiaries are women. Among
those receiving survivor and disability benefits, women and
children constitute 85 percent. Women also depend more on
Social Security. Older women who are not part of a couple
(either widows, divorcees, separated, or never married) get 51
percent of their income from Social Security, and 25 percent
of them have no income but Social Security. For men in the
same situation (a far smaller proportion of the total), the
figures are 39 and 20 percent, respectively.
The
poverty rate for older women is almost twice that of older men
(in 1997, 13.1 percent versus 7.0 percent). For older women
who are not in a couple, the rate gets much higher: more than
one in four lives below the poverty line. Fewer than half of
them had incomes in 1997 above $1,000 per month. Without
Social Security's guaranteed benefits, the already marginal
income security for older women would be much worse.
In spite of the improvement in employment
opportunities for women, the role of homemaker and primary
parent still falls unequally on wives and mothers. Private
accounts would jeopardize income that wives, widows, and
divorcees now receive under Social Security. The more
individual control that passes to workers, the fewer rights
their dependents will retain to secure retirement income. If
the guarantees and redistributive features of Social Security
are replaced with a system that provides benefits according
only to how much a worker earns over that worker's lifetime
and how fortunate that worker is in financial markets, the
average woman, especially the average widow, will lose
security and income from already low levels.
REASON #11: African Americans and Latin Americans
also would become more vulnerable under privatization.
Privatization advocates often claim that converting Social
Security to a system of private accounts would
disproportionately help African Americans and Latin Americans
because those groups are purportedly shortchanged by the
current system. But in fact there is almost no difference in
Social Security's payback by race. And because both of those
groups on average earn lower lifetime earnings than whites,
those minorities would be at greater risk of facing poverty in
their retirement under privatization.
African Americans
on average have two characteristics that are disadvantageous
under Social Security: shorter life expectancy and a lower
marriage rate. But they
also have traits that lead to greater benefits under Social
Security: a higher disability rate, more survivors
receiving benefits, and lower average wages. Latinos also have
relatively low incomes on average, but a
longer life expectancy and fewer average years in the
workforce. As the figure below shows, the bottom line is
that there is almost no difference by race in the benefits per
dollar of Social Security taxes paid. Click
to view Figure 3: Benefits Received per Dollar of Payroll
Taxes, by Race and Ethnicity
Source: Lee Cohen, C. Eugene Steuerle, and Adam Carasso,
"Social Security Redistribution by Education, Race, and
Income: How Much and Why," paper presented at the Third Annual
Conference of the Retirement Research Consortium, "Making Hard
Choices about Retirement," Washington, D.C., May 17-18, 2001.
A 2 percent discount rate is used, which tends to reduce the
benefits per dollar of taxes. The numbers are for those born
between 1956 and 1964.
But because African-Americans and Latinos on average have
substantially less wealth upon retirement than whites, they
are far more dependent on Social Security. Converting the
program into a system where their retirement income would be
more dependent on investment markets would make those groups
even more vulnerable to poverty.
Click
to view Figure 4: Median Wealth at Retirement by Race and
Ethnicity
Source: Marjorie Honig, "Minorities Face Retirement:
Worklife Disparities Repeated?" in Forecasting Retirement
Needs and Retirement Wealth, B. Hammond, O. Mitchell, and A.
Rappaport, eds. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 1999), Table 4. The data are for 1992 adjusted to 2001
prices.
REASON #12: Retirees will not be
protected against inflation.
Social Security privatization plans, including all three
recommended by the President's Commission to Strengthen Social
Security, require retirees to convert the lump sums in their
personal accounts into annuities that provide them with
monthly payments until their death. The reason for that is
that otherwise retirees could outlive their nest eggs, or even
squander them, requiring taxpayers to bail them out.
The market for annuities, which are financial
contracts sold by insurance companies, is very thin now, with
relatively few bought and sold. Such a market would probably
develop under privatization, but it
is unlikely that those annuity payments would increase in line
with inflation, as today's Social Security benefits do.
Without inflation protection, the purchasing power of
retirees' pensions would fall precipitously during times when
prices are rising rapidly. Because insurance companies would
bear significant new risks for offering inflation protection,
they would be likely to charge very substantial fees over and
above the already steep 10 percent that they now charge.
Conclusion
Current Social Security insurance protections have served
the country well for decades. Diluting those protections in
exchange for new accounts poses all kinds of new risks while
making the relatively manageable long-term challenges
confronting Social Security far more immediate and severe.
Notes
Introduction
". . . amounting to be between
$2 trillion and $3 trillion . . ." Peter A. Diamond and Peter
R. Orszag, "Reducing
Benefits and Subsidizing Individual Accounts: An Analysis of
the Plans Proposed by the President's Commission to Strengthen
Social Security," Center on Budget and Policy Priorities
and The Century Foundation, June 2002, p. 7.
REASON
#1
Diamond
and Orszag, pp. 10-11.
See also Greg Anrig and
Bernard Wasow, "What
Would Really Happen under Social Security Privatization? Part
IV: Insecurity for the Disabled and Dependents of Workers and
Retirees who Die," The Century Foundation, New York City,
December 10, 2001.
REASON #3
Economic Report
of the President (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, February 2004), p. 144.
"If anything, our
impression . . ." Peter A. Diamond and Peter R. Orszag, Saving
Social Security: A Balanced Approach (Washington, D.C.:
Brookings Institution Press, 2004), p. 161.
REASON
#4
"more than half of all workers . . ." Indermit
S. Gil, Truman Packard, and Juan Yermo, Keeping
the Promise of Old Age Income Security in Latin America
(Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2004), p. 10.
"Investment accounts of retirees are much smaller . .
." Stephen J. Kay and Milko Matijascic, Social Security at the
Crossroads: Toward Effective Pension Reform in Latin America,
Unpublished paper prepared for the XXVI Conference of the
Latin America Studies Association-LASA, Las Vegas, Oct. 6-8,
2004, p. 6.
"The World Bank found that . . ." Gil
et al, p. 8.
"The brokerage firm CB Capitales . .
." Tema
Especial: ¿Cuál ha sido la verdadera Rentabilidad del Sistema
de AFP? CB Capitales, Departamento de Estudios, April 8,
1999; also see Stephen J. Kay, State
Capacities and Pensions, Unpublished paper prepared for
the Latin American Studies Association XXIV International
Conference in Dallas, March 27-29, 2003, p.12.
"The
transition costs of shifting . . ." JosEE. Devesa-Carpio and
Carlos Vidal-MeliE The
Reformed Pension Systems in Latin America, Social
Protection Discussion Paper Series, No. 0209.
"A British government commission . . ." Andrew Balls and
Chris Giles, "Dubious Special Relationship Links Two Pension
Reform Schemes," Financial Times, November 18, 2004, p.
2.
REASON #5
"Indeed, research by
Princeton economist Burton G. Malkiel . . ." Burton G.
Malkiel, "Returns from Investing in Equity Mutual Funds 1971
to 1991," The Journal of Finance 50, no. 2 (June 1995):
572.
"For example, a Securities and Exchange Commission
report . . ." "The Facts on
Saving and Investing: Excerpts from Recent Polls and Studies
Highlighting the Need for Financial Education," The
Securities and Exchange Commission, Washington, D.C., April,
1999.
REASON #6
"Gary Burtless of the
Brookings Institution demonstrated . . ." Gary Burtless,
personal communication, see also "Risk
and Returns of Stock Market Investments Held in Individual
Retirement Accounts," Testimony before Task Force on
Social Security Reform, House Budget Committee, May 11, 1999.
REASON #7
"Among the one hundred best
mutual funds . . ." Consumer Reports, March
2001.
REASON #8
"Francis X. Cavanaugh .
. . has argued . . ." Statement
of Francis X. Cavanaugh before the Senate Budget
Committee, July 21, 1998.
REASON #9
"According to the Congressional Budget Office . .
." "How
Pension Financing Affects Returns to Different
Generations," Congressional Budget Office, Washington,
D.C., September 22, 2004.
"A June 2004 Congressional
Budget Office analysis . . ." "Long-Term
Analysis of Plan 2 of the President's Commission to Strengthen
Social Security," Congressional Budget Office, Letter to
Senatior Larry E. Craig, July 21, 2004 (updated September 30,
2004).
"An earlier analysis . . ." Henry J. Aaron,
Alan S. Blinder, Alicia H. Munnell, and Peter R. Orszag, "Governor
Bush's Individual Account Proposal: Implications for
Retirement Benefits," Issue Brief 11, The Century
Foundation, New York, 2000.
REASON
#10
Bernard Wasow, "Setting
the Record Straight: Women and Social Security," The
Century Foundation, New York City, April 1, 2002.
REASON # 11
Bernard Wasow, "Setting
the Record Straight: Two False Claims about African Americans
and Social Security," The Century Foundation, New York
City, March 1, 2002.
Bernard Wasow, "Social
Security Works for Latinos," The Century Foundation, New
York City, May 1, 2002.
REASON #12
Greg
Anrig and Bernard Wasow, "What
Would Really Happen Under Social Security Privatization? Part
III: Millionaires One and All?" The Century Foundation,
New York City, December 10, 2001.
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